

2-2 24 (no flight)
No flight: 16, 21, 28 (no flight), 29-31, 1-2 Nov

Last two flights: 15 Nov 30-31 none;

29 Oct: Continuing analysis of 27 Oct showed
continuing construction & concealment. Camouflage &
concealment were becoming more effective.

all 015: K's 23 Oct message appeared to be an
attempt to ward off any contemplated US action that
might destroy the bases. No proof ["haul" ?]
that the Saus had begun dismantling missile sites or
IL-28s. Latest photos, taken prior to low altitude,
showed construction proceeding rapidly.

(no flight)

30 Oct: No evidence in 29 Oct low-level photos that
Saus were dismantling or excavating any of offensive
missile sites. On the contrary, construction of fuel
storage bunkers & concealment activities were
continuing.

no flight

31 Oct: Available evidence still did not indicate Saus preparing
for dismantling or excavating the sites. Although many missile
erectors had been removed from their hardstands, the ant.
believed to have had any effect on the full per. col.

012. 011 Dip. 012. 013. After comparing photos of 27-29 Oct.

to evidence of directly, evidence of additional construction
as well as of extensive construction.

Tricky

C. Nov. from low-level photos 4/1 Nov. shows main shadowing.

30 Oct

US wanted in negotiation... rights of US to surveillance,
without interference, as long as US guaranteed in any way
the non-invasion of Cuba.

Still mentioned only offensive systems.

C. Nov: on oct. page

15 Nov: last low-level. Castro letter to O. Plant warning to fire on
US recon aircraft. [Should be taken into account?]

16 Nov. US recon aircraft flight for 17 Nov. with well
defended targets, ready fighter escort missions.

Advised that that Armed Forces were at optimum posture to
execute Cuba Air strikes & invasion. Could maintain for 30 days.

[Disappeared? No low-level after 15th] (over)

7 Nov: recommend to 2nd Def. US reaction to a hostile
attack on US assets might be:

a) Protest to USSR re: at UN and within:

b) Full attack on all airfields & air defense weapons
systems in Cuba, & consideration of additional measures, if not
judged part of deliberate program of resistance to ^{hostile} surveillance,
or c) If not judged isolated incident, limited retali-
ation, preferably against responsible site.

9 Nov: JCS concern with USA paper "Long Term Surveillance
Requirements": complete high level coverage every 30 day &
low-level flights or on-site inspections of suspicious locations;
sufficient low-level flights to protect the "right" to
survive flights whether or not suspicious activities were located,
& stopping surveillance

04:

18 Nov: Cubans couldn't interfere with only little with low-level

19 Nov: in view of high level concern against low-level flights

19-20 Nov, to recommend only U-2 for 20 Nov., nothing wins on
US reaction to hostile reb. (7 Nov)

20 Nov: Rules of Engagement for higher altitude of low level. ^{Question} _{afternoon}

[Have two bird flights been started again?

Note: difference found on Castro threats.

Are longer bird flights needed? Attitude on
"incidents"? Controversy?)

Cubical (like Sept 4) with Press statement on 20 Nov,
warm continued.

See: 24 mms, Brown Pigeon in Cuba. \pm red.

1. M.N.'s Magic Word

Demands for: analysis comes in form of:
You'll want to know

2. Why ask why? What are the consequences?

3. Retelling, power, life: finding of VCS, expressing conflicts, lack of analysis, evidence for generals.

Spent; inability to answer, rationale for saying.

Control of VCS activity

4. Absence of influence of system analysis in OSO and Services

Thin style of analysis applies to larger system questions
of R&D, procurement, posture, plans.

Thin limitations - multiple style (M.N.'s)

Focus for

5) Change, innovation, evolution: budgeting, policy, direction

Plans, force levels,

Many acts of 1958; new role of VCS, OSO, and OSO. Program packages

6. Attitudes toward style & change & influence:

Blackett; Papoport; White; Bolding; White;
Newman.

7. Difference between public relations and scientific work

(Kolm; Bolding, 1941).

not: comparing with, given thing.

Difference between then & now.

8. Analysis continues. Is this a good thing? Are we glad?

Two types

Kolm: (longer side)

9. Real problem of data: e.g. Bomb damage

Kind & bad analyses: simplicity, destruction of the best of them.

Failures of prediction with best: R-266.

10. But what are alternatives?

Blackett: but, collect of "wisdom," mostly.

Still relevance of experience, tacit knowledge.

Kolm: NO. Attention is not "knowledge," free
& scientific, more hypothesis theory: full complexity of models.

It is not cause of influence of ASD; but cause of
info, consequences, national objectives, perspective (C+C)

Simplicity is essential, but...

Planning for alternatives. But very poor, but lack of
planning, or one-option planning

Single models; strategies; single factors, dichotomies.

^a
Kahn: need for response. Forth?

But: 1) derivative process; innovation, etc.

C+C
Controlled response
ht. exts

2) like candle, reveals darkness to use, the
size & importance of the room

Different options

2212 A+L Foreign Cars 548-3443

3500 1/2 off 8 miles

P.S. Import Motors Southern Station, Wash + Del

Happy Center, 123 S. Wayne Ind.

527-9627

Col. Sanders 53155

Robert Paul 11450 13-24066

Weiss

Lat

27 Oct: No evidence of base intent to halt construction;

5 sites open, 6th by 28 Oct.

Photos of 25 Oct implied presence of FROs,
tanks, armored vehicles, in a camp.

A U-2 over Cuba reported overdue,
(where?) then missing; presumed down. Where plane's location
unknown, & whether loss had resulted from hostile action.
Subsequent Cuban reports of recovery of wreckage & pilot's
body established location, but Castro never explicitly
acknowledged shooting down.

ICS recommended air strike no later than 29 Oct
unless irrefutable evidence of dismantling obtained in
meantime.

Loss of U-2 assumed by ICS with SecDef in light
of action decided on 23 Oct in event of such happening.
(Inform Pres through SAC/DOD ^{pres.} demands ^{recomm.} immediate
retal against the ^{most} likely ²⁰⁰, and probe continue U-2).

In view of absence of any facts regarding cause of loss, decided
no action pending receipt of more info.

24 Oct. K: ships mostly not observed.

25 Oct. 3 ^{unexpected minor comms} SU ships, reportedly changing course; all S's

dry cargo ships seemed to be pulling back from
main entrance line.

26 Oct. 3 low ships now steering east, not all but
on dry cargo ships.

Letter from K, 23 Oct.

Answer by JFK, 23 Oct.

Letter by K, 24 Oct.

Answer by JFK, 25 Oct.

Letter by K, 26 Oct.

Answer by JFK, 27 Oct.

Letter by JFK, 27 Oct.

27 Oct. K: The vessels would not be instructed to submit to

questioning, and should US forces "violate" international

laws of navigation, USSR would take the measures deemed
necessary.

[When did ships draw back?]

28 Oct. report of drawback

JFK answer: SU had made first challenge, US had

responded. It had been decided to take action necessary

to restore pre-crisis situation.

20 Oct, after 1300: decided SAC alert air. could be moved from
unlimited bases beginning 22 Oct.

21 Oct: Interruption should be obtained from SecDef

to disperse COMAD fighters and SAC B-47s the
afternoon of 22 Oct.

"To recommend (to whom?) that SAC initiate
force generation, COMAD planes should be dispersed of
one round interception, and SAC implement partial air alert
(whom?)

22. JCRC was to inform SACSEC of developments.

US forces to go to increased alert (?) at P-4s,
except for EUCOM. (?) 2300, 22 Oct. SECINCEUR
to use his discretion in complying with directives in light
of warning order of 21 Oct (?)

SAC would initiate, gradually & gradually, partial a.c.
beginning 1200, 22 Oct.

SAC, at his discretion (?) implement B-47 dispersal
beginning 1200, 22 Oct. COMAD likewise, on quiet basis.

Subject to SecDef approval, SAC generation beginning 200,
22 Oct to ramp up at 1200, 22 Oct.

(SecDef knows? Approved?)

23 Nov: (after Summary, 10 Nov)

D/S Supplement on Nov forces;
now believed to number about 16,000.

30 personnel

6 Oct: believed to 5000.

19 Oct: not more than 5-9000 specialists.

27 Oct: Photos of 25 Oct showed camp, FROG, tanks, ^{at Ponsion}

8 Nov: 2 Nov. photos showed more FROG, etc. to Orleans.

4 Nov announced battalions Infantry in Cuba.

7 Nov: low personnel with 3900

... cruise missiles 500

at least 1230 troops for defense of missiles:

scrapper anti-tank, ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ 4 tank battalions (each with
31 T-54 tanks
and 250 mm)

10 Nov D/S on Cuban/Nov forces

12 Nov: photos of 10 Nov showed air-to-air missiles for Mig-23.

photos of 9 Nov suggested that the 4 Nov units were

composite, announced or such. groupings of near organized strength.

13. Assume evidence indicated greater strength groupings but

total of well over 4000 troops (rather than 2000-1200).

14 Nov. Believed to D/S on 16 Nov; 17-23 is around, prof. by negotiating
Chenese blockade not found by by rail action; that US notes withdrawal of
US not personnel in considerable negot. objectives, [?]

Chronology

5 Aug: views showed no signif. military buildup.
possible MIG;

20 Aug: SA-2 sites: first sig. of. buildups in Cuban military features.

see. Daily Ind. Sum. (DIS) of Sept. 6 ("defensive")

5 Sept: first proof of MIG-25.

4 Oct: DIA established Cuban 2nd. Comm. 34 km bases

10 Oct: DIA received Navy photo later. Center report of
photos of 25 Sept. - probable IL-28 units.

[Overall defensive picture. is it still VCS believe?]

VCS meeting 1400-1700 on 15 Oct: possible ops against Cuba.

[Did they know yet? Had they already concluded?]

What of earlier brief requests for plans?]

20 Oct Review "hard" evidence on our workbooks.

On first "hard" evidence was testimony of "body" and weapons storage bunker.

(Suppose earlier reluctance to predict mass had persisted, and some standards of "hardness".)

Why a conviction on 27 Oct that decision on air host must be soon?

(What was report on us of U-2 aircraft, findings?)

(What would we have done about further shootdowns?)

When/how did SecDef/Excom learn of or participate in decision

(1900, 2100)

on SAC airborne alert, dispersal, C/CONV42 dispersal,

DEFCO.12 (1900, 2400)

SAC force generation?

(When did SAC actually begin generation?)

What changed?

What was SEC response between 12 and 7, 22 Oct?

Close of offer

8 in Kentucky: pushed for their conventional cap (State, Army)
But Baldwin stonies.

Paine concept on Army

He reluctant on ones. Felt not informed of final thought on ones

Johnson: JCS attempt to write a Treaty with Pres (Laos)

They will agree, if he will guarantee that if... he will...

25. 31 Oct. (when requested? 27 Oct?)

General belief: That in event of a low attack on fighters in Turkey

with HE, 6 alternatives available that didn't involve

US use of nukes: a) NATO in blocks with com.

in pos on selected military targets in satellites;

b) same, for USSR, c) Destruction of low subs on high seas;

d) Sub warfare on all Blue shipping & naval bases;

e) Seizure of Blue shipping as opportunity presented;

f) With NATO allies, closing Bosporus, Dardanelles, &

Black Straits to Blue shipping.

Less effective: delayed impact measures: increasing

US defenses in Europe & Med. & closing Panama Canal.

NATO strategy was based on principle that
Pointed out: any low Blue attack on a NATO country

would call for immediate military retaliation by NATO;

therefore, a low attack on fighters under circumstances

given (?) highly improbable.

[Like judgment on low flying missiles in Cuba!]

3) Pass to G21.

Decided: SAC but message would be moved from

16 Oct: Air Task (MYROM?) could be initiated 24 hrs
after approval; begin strike + invasion, 16 days.

18 Oct: earliest possible date for strike, 21 Oct;
after 23 Oct; earliest for invasion, 28 Oct.

19 Oct: presented to Pres at 1000 hrs: only satisfactory
solution to the Cuban problem from the military point of
view was surprise attack on communication targets,
weon, complete blockade, & ultimate invasion.

Recognized, a strain on alliances & problems with Berlin.

20 Oct: 1000-1400. Talking Paper for CJS for afternoon
with meeting. (done)

Approved:

[see] drafted by Bundy. Air Task within (19 Oct),
possible war started (22 Oct), announcement (23 Oct),
Pres speech (23 Oct)

1815: informed of Decision. CND & apparent JCS (blockade).

JCS to be prepared to execute strike against missiles only;
without warning 22 or 23 Oct, if the strike is called; if invasion is called,

16 Oct. JCS 1630-1845

i. Selective MRBM strike dangerous; in attack on
MRBMs + MIGs only, unsound, as US should strike air
bases, air defenses and SAMs to eliminate the total
threat. (Also, tanks and all other signif. military
targets - those which can offset US or its forces. The
objection, to eliminate threat to US and
liberate Cuba. [Why this dropped?] [escalation?
allies?]
air strike + blockade acceptable.
See evidence chart + to be heard.

17 Oct. 0930-1610. Discuss possible low reactions
possible on US (Berlin, Germany, Iran, Turkey, Korea); most
likely Berlin. Most likely low reactions at sea, w. Iran,
or by an ICBM "accident" on Pacific Test Site (Johnston
Island). [?] and that should strong emergency
action at Berlin, death of regime, could reasonably be expected.

Plans for Mr. DeF. JCS confirmed views, presented orally.

18 Oct. Unethical or all military targets + blockade; opposing
strike on USSR alone; claim of Castro would require invasion.

Stevenson - Sec 10/31/62

Sec Amb told U Thant

Order from K to dismantle received between 1 and 3 pm.
Started dismantling by 5 on Sunday. Will be all over
it later by Friday, when we will have finished
bulldozing of sites. Even the pads will be gone, but
no Cuban observation of the dismantling is permitted.

As to aircraft, Puccio assured them that ~~no~~ Cubans had
not been trained to fly them. Any equipment, low-manned
will go. All the A-4, but SAM - conventional, is manned by
Cubans. It was a Cuban Colonel that shot down our plane.

Castro is frustrated, intense, hysterical.

Package please log off the recon till Friday. After that you
will find they have bulldozed all of the sites.

11/1/62 Bell - Sec. Castro talked as though he had all the recon
aircraft and he did boast that it was the Cubans who had

shot down Major Anderson. Relye himself is not at all
persuaded that this was ^{not} first ~~not~~ only boastfulness on his
part.

... He feels that there is a state of very definite kind of
hysteria down there at the moment; that they are psychologically
going to be looking for flights today and that they are going
to throw everything that they have. After Castro makes his speech
he thinks that if we could delay until tomorrow that the
chances of getting into any real trouble are considerably diminished,
particularly if we change the flight patterns.

(That might want to have to invite going, but it won't follow... SN)
Lt. said on a Security Council meeting that Castro would ask him
to hold the meeting off till after the 6th...

Spec: Why the 6th!

Ball: Why, an election.

McN-Bell 11/5 11:59

From intercept, looks as if we have lost a plane,
a low-level one shot down by Russian-speaking people, &
it appears we have a fighter attack on two of our other
aircraft. Our own aircraft have not yet reported in.
... I should be held very long.

11/3/62 10 am Bundy-Bell

Stavros not shown JFK reply to K, put: Office too busy
Bundy: Reason for being edgy is that the very existence of secret
correspondence with K has been a mission in the past;
the moment anyone says there is a message, we have
to show it to Alpheus; then we are in trouble - is the
message of the 26th clause.

[10/27/62: 10:50 See had arranged to send off 9 or 26 letter to
London, Paris + Frankfurt, with instructions to give to Mac + de G.
[Other: telling Alpheus is like publishing in NYT]